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I.

EVIDENCE

INTRODUCTION

In Ohio v. Thomas,' a jury found Kathy Thomas guilty of murdering her
2
common law husband, Reuben Daniels. Thomas admitted firing the fatal shots,
but claimed she acted in self-defense.3 A central feature of Thomas' self-defense
theory was that she was a victim of the battered wife syndrome. 4 She claimed
5
Daniels had repeatedly beaten and abused her for more than three years.
6
At trial, the defense counsel called an expert on the battered wife syndrome.
The defense offered the expert testimony to aid the jury in assessing Thomas'
1. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 518, 423 N.E.2d 137, 138 (1981).
2. Id. The defendant shot Daniels once in the arm and once in the forehead. Id.
3. Id. The defendant reported three different versions of the facts to the police. In each
version, a verbal argument was followed by some minor pushing and shoving. The viciim never
had control of the gun. Id. at '518-19, 423 N.E.2d at 138. In order to prove self-defense, the
defendant had to show that she had reasonable grounds to believe she was in immediate danger
of serious bodily harm or death at the hands of the victim, and that the killing was a necessary
response to save herself from serious bodily harm or death. Id. at 520, 423 N.E.2d at 139.
4. Id. at 519, 423 N.E.2d at 138. The battered wife, or battered woman, syndrome describes
a pattern of both psychological and physical abuse inflicted upon a woman by her spouse or mate.
Note, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentar Analysis, 77 Nw.
U.L. REv. 348, 350 (1982). The foremost expert on battered women is generally recognized to
be Dr. Lenore Walker. Walker has described the theory as a three-stage cycle of abuse: a tensionbuilding stage, a period of acute violence, and a period of reconciliation. L. WALKER, THE BATrERED
WOMAN XV (1979).
5. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d at 519, 423 N.E.2d at 138 (1981).
6. Id. The court did not closely examine Mr. Buckley's qualifications. He is described as
a "psychiatric social worker." Id. at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
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state of mind at the time of the shooting. 7 The trial court excluded the expert
testimony. 8 The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial,
holding that it was error to exclude Buckley's testimony. 9 The Ohio Supreme
Court reversed and reinstated the conviction.'0
The supreme court noted several reasons in approving the exclusion of the
testimony. First, the expert testimony was "irrelevant and immaterial" to the
defendant's self-defense argument.' Second, the subject matter of the proposed
testimony was within the jury's understanding. 1 2 Third, the battered wife syndrome was not generally accepted as a scientific reliability to be admitted as
expert testimony.'" Finally, concern that such evidence would stereotype the
defendant prompted the court's finding that the testimony's prejudicial impact
4
would outweigh its probative value.'
Psychological profile, or syndrome evidence involves the correlation between
groups of traits or characteristics and specific forms of behavior., ' A syndrome
is a set of signs or symptoms that tends to indicate a particular condition. It
involves a class of actions, emotions or events that forms a characteristic pattern.b
Expert testimony concerning a psychological profile can be used to explain past
behavior, forecast future behavior, measure current capacity or discover the
causes of a current condition. 7 In a battered wife syndrome case, for example,

7. Id. at 519, 423 N.E.2d at 138.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 520, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
11.
Id. at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 140. The court explained that "[t]he jury will base its decision
upon the material and relevant evidence concerning the participants' words and actions before, at,
and following the murder, including defendant's explanation of the surrounding circumstances."
Id. at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 139.
12. Id. at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 140. "The jury is- well able to understand and determine
whether self-defense has been proven in a murder case without expert testimony such as that offered
here." Id. at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 139.
13. Id. at 521-22, 423 N.E.2d at 140. The court noted that the testimony "is not distinctly
related to some science, profession or occupation so as to be beyond the ken of the average lay
person. Furthermore, no general acceptance of the expert's particular methodology has been established." Id. at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 139; see infra notes 60 & 105-06 and accompanying text.
14. Id. at 522, 423 N.E.2d at 140. The court was concerned that the jury "could decide
the facts based upon typical, and not the actual, facts." Id. at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
15. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE 5 206(D) (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). McCormick
explained:
[W]e all evaluate information in the light of some such "profiles." Jurors, for example,
can be said to bring to the courtroom their preconceived "profiles" which they then apply
to decide who is lying and who is telling the truth, and who is likely to have committed
an offense and who is innocent. Although there is no fundamental difference between the
psychological and medical profiles and the more common, impressionistic ones, some of
the former have been derived in a more or less systematic and structured way, and some
may have been tested by verifying that they give correct diagnoses or predictions when
applied to new cases. The correlations obtained in such prospective studies measure the
validity of the profiles.
Id.
16. WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1174 (1981).
17. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and its
Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REv. 395, 464 n.270 (1985).
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the expert testifies as to whether the victim fits the profile of a battered woman."
If the woman fits the profile, the syndrome is used to reconstruct and explain
9
her past behavior and mental state at the time of the incident in question.'
Thomas is representative of the ad hoc reasoning that characterizes cases
21
involving the admissibility of psychological profile and syndrome evidence.
2
Without analyzing the underlying basis of the theory, ' the Thomas court con22
cluded the battered wife syndrome was not a generally accepted scientific theory.
Similarly, the court decided the theory was within the jury's understanding and

was irrelevant to the self-defense issue?3 The court's fear of stereotyping may

reveal a belief that syndrome evidence is merely improper character evidence
based upon unreliable probability evidence.2 4 Additionally,2 5 a general distrust of
psychological expert testimony may underly the decision.
Decisions such as Thomas are not necessarily "wrong," but the reasoning
they exhibit in denying the admissibility of syndrome evidence is frequently
unclear or unsound.2 6 The rules and tests governing admissibility of this type
of evidence are broad and indefinite, allowing a great deal of judicial discretion.2 7 This discretion has been exercised in an irrational manner because of
the fears and myths surrounding the usefulness of psychological profile and
syndrome evidence at trial. The unfortunate result of this uneven use of dis18. See Note, supra note 4, at 351.
19. The battered wife syndrome can be used to support the reasonableness of a woman's
belief that she is in imminent danger. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
This cycle of violence helps explain why battered women do not leave their abusers: simply
put, the third stage of the cycle reaffirms the woman's hopes that her mate's behavior
will change. In addition, since the woman cannot predict or control the occurrence of
acute outbreaks of violence, she sinks into a "psychological paralysis" in which she feels
helpless to change her situation. Battered women also stay with their abusers for a variety
of other reasons, including financial dependence, children, guilt, and fear of reprisal by

their husbands. Critically, the abused woman rarely reaches out for help to friends, family
or the police, because of fear of reprisal and shame. Thus, the battered woman not only
feels imprisoned, but also prevents the possibility of outside assistance by remaining silent.
As a result, the battered women live with a sense of constant fear coupled with a perceived
inability to escape their situation.
Note, supra note 4, at 351.
20. See Massaro, supra note 17, at 464.

21.

The Ohio court did cite to Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979), a

leading case in which battered wife syndrome testimony was held to be admissible, but declined
to follow that decision. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d at 521 n.3, 423 N.E.2d at 139 n.3; see infra notes
100-17 and accompanying text.
22. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 139. The court cited Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), but did not actually discuss the general acceptance standard.
The court merely concluded that the test was not met. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d at 521, 423 N.E.2d

at 139; see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 19.
24. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
25.
26.

See infra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.
The concept for this Note was suggested by Professor Massaro. See Massaro, supra note

17. She discussed the pattern of inconsistent evidentiary analysis among syndrome evidence in her
paper on the rape trauma syndrome. Id.
27. Id. at 435; see infra notes 29-58 and accompanying text.
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cretion is a body of case law characterized by inconsistency in evidentiary
analysis.2 8 Thus, practitioners must predict which evidentiary principles a particular court might deem important.
This Note will first consider the evidentiary rules and tests governing the
admissibility of syndrome evidence, focusing on the broadness of the rules and
the difficulties in applying the tests. Second, the nature of syndrome evidence
will be examined, with special emphasis on the doubts surrounding this type
of evidence. Third, a cross section of the case law will be analyzed, identifying
inconsistencies as well as prevalent evidentiary bases for decisions. Fourth, several admissibility tests will be critically analyzed. Finally, a method for dealing
with syndrome evidence will be proposed. This method is not a radical shift
or even a "new rule"; rather, the proposal involves a back-to-evidentiary-basics
approach.
II.

RULES OF EVIDENCE AND TESTS OF ADMISSIBILITY

Federal Rule of Evidence 70229 governing the admissibility of expert testimony is broad and therefore allows a great deal of judicial discretion."' Admissibility under Rule 702 essentially hinges upon whether the expert testimony
will aid the factfinder in understanding certain evidence or in resolving a factual
issue." Some state rules of evidence adopt the federal rule's language, 12 while
others employ different phraseology. " Although some commentators feel the

28. See Massaro, supra note 17, at 464. When a case that is based upon unsound or unclear
evidentiary principles is relied upon as precedent, that reliance lends support to the unsound reasoning of the original case. The questionable evidentiary principles used in the original case become
more entrenched and more difficult to overturn with each additional case that cites to the original
case as precedent.
29. FED. R. EvID. 702. The rule provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
30. Massaro, supra note 17, at 433. This Note will focus on the helpfulness requirement rather
than the qualifications of the experts. However, a brief comment on the qualifications might be
useful. Seegenerally Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process
The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REv. 427 (1980). Bonnie and Slobogin suggested that
forensic training and practical experience, rather than education alone, should be the primary
considerations in examining the qualifications of mental health professionals. Id. at 457.
31.
FED. R. EvID. 702.
32. By January 1981, the following twenty-one states had adopted a form of the Federal
Rules in their codes: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 6 FED. R. EvID. NEws (CALLACIHAN) No
1, at 81-1 (Jan. 1981). By October 1981, Oregon had adopted the Rules bringing the total number
to 22. 6 FED. R. EviD. NEws (CALLACHAN) No. 10, at 81-109 (Oct. 9, 1981).
33. Many states that have chosen not to adopt the Federal Rules follow the three-part Dyas
test. Cf. Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977). The
first step of the Dyas test requires that the subject matter of the testimony be "so distinctively
related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average
layman." The second step requires that the expert have "sufficient skill, knowledge or experience
in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the
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distinctions between the state and federal rules are crucial, this note assumes
that the wide discretion afforded judges is responsible for uneven and unpre34
dictable decisionmaking
As a general rule for admissibility, all jurisdictions require that expert testimony be "helpful." 3 5 The "helpfulness" requirement involves consideration
of the following factors: whether the testimony is within the knowledge of the
jury; whether the testimony will confuse, overawe, or prejudice the jury; whether
the testimony is reliable; and whether admitting the testimony will result in a
waste of the court's time.3 6 Assuming the evidence is reliable, the central question is whether an untrained juror can approach the issue with the highest
possible degree of competency without an expert's assistance.37 The helpfulness
of expert testimony regarding syndromes is dependent upon the premise that
the expert is uniquely qualified to draw accurate conclusions from background
data and behavior patterns.

3

The rule governing admission of expert opinion testimony addressing ultimate issues is similarly broad.3 9 Federal Rule of Evidence 704 permits experts
to express an opinion even if it involves the "ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact.'"'4 The federal rule reflects a trend away from the unduly
restrictive 2 traditional rule prohibiting such testimony. 42 Although this restriction
has been eliminated in most jurisdictions, 43 fears that opinion testimony would
44
invade the province or usurp the function of the jury are still alive.
trier in his search for truth." Finally, the theory upon which the testimony is to be based must
be sufficiently developed to the point that an opinion can reasonably be drawn by an expert. Id.
34. See, e.g., Commentary, Expert Testimony and Battered Women: Conflict Among the Courts and
a Proposal, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 267 (1982). The author asserts that the Dyas test is more strict than
the Federal Rule and that "[tihe conflict between the courts over the admissibility of expert tes-

timony about the battered woman's syndrome in homicide trials could be resolved by uniform
adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702." Id. at 292.
35. See J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 1923 (3d. ed. 1940). "On this subject can a jury from this person receive

appreciable help?" Id. (emphasis in original).
36. Massaro, supra note 17, at 432-33.
37. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 418 (1952). As Ladd explained:
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the
common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine
intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from
those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.
Id.
38. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 30, at 463.
39. FED. R. EvID. 704. The rule provides: "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided -by
the trier of fact." Id.
40. Id.
41. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 12. The traditional rule "can often unfairly obstruct
the presentation of a party's case, to say nothing of the illogic of the notion that opinions on
ultimate facts usurp the function of the jury." Id.
42. The trend away from the traditional rule began in 1942 and perhaps culminated with
the adoption of FED. R. EviD. 704. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. McCormick explained that "[o]bviously these expressions were not intended to be
taken literally, but merely to suggest the danger that the jury might forego independent analysis
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The test for relevancy is also quite liberal. Under Federal Rule of Evidence
401, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a material fact more
While the relevancy test appears to be an easy hurdle, it
or less probable.
can be deceptive.4 6 The test contains two components: materiality and probativeness.47 A court which prefers to rely only on concrete facts, such as words
and actions, may find that syndrome evidence does not relate to a material
fact.4 1 Similarly, a court which distrusts expert psychological testimony could
find that syndrome evidence is not probative." Additionally, the court may
exclude relevant evidence if it finds the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by risks such as undue prejudice and jury confusion."
Federal Rule of Evidence 404, dealing with character evidence, appears to
be more clearly defined and less discretionary than the other rules relating to
syndrome evidence.' When used offensively against a defendant, syndrome eviof

the facts and bow too readily to the opinion of an expert or otherwise influential witness." Id.
See infra notes 118-32 and accompanying text.
45. FED. R. EvID. 401. The rule provides: " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id. Rule 402 adds: "All
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EvD.
402.
46. Recall that the court in Thomas found the battered wife syndrome testimony to be irrelevant. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
47. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 185.
48. This appears to have been the case in Thomas. The Ohio Supreme Court felt the only
facts relevant to the issue of self-defense were the actions of the parties and the defendant's own
statements as to the reasonableness of her belief. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
49. The general distrust of psychological expert testimony may also have been a factor in
Thomas. Such a distrust is implicit in the decision. See infta notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
50. FED. R. EvtD. 403. The rule provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
51.
FED. R. EvIo. 404. The rule provides:
(a) Character evidence, generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trail of his
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith
on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait or character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution
in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in rules 607, 608 and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
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dence may be inadmissible. Rule 404 bars character evidence offered for the
purpose of proving the defendant acted in conformity with a trait on a particular
occasion.5 2 However, this general rule has several exceptions. The accused may
offer evidence of a relevant personal trait or evidence of the victim's character;
the prosecution may rebut such evidence with other character evidence.53 Thus,
54
a defendant is protected by the rule unless he first introduces such evidence.
Another exception is that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, while not
admissible to prove character or action in conformity on a particular occasion,
may be admissible for other purposes, such as to show absence of mistake or
accident.

55

The general prohibition embodied in Rule 404 rests on the premise that
character evidence usually has low probative value and a high potential for jury
confusion and prejudice. 6 Much syndrome evidence could be classified as scientific psychological evidence based upon character or behavioral traits. 57 Thus,
Rule 404's basic premise suggests that if a particular category of syndrome
evidence could be shown to be sufficiently reliable and accurate, then the evidence should be admissible.58 This possibility, along with the established exceptions, leaves the effect of Rule 404 on syndrome evidence unclear.
When expert testimony is based on novel scientific theories, courts frequently
apply special tests of admissibility which supplement the codified rules. These
tests have developed primarily out of a concern that juries would be overwhelmed by novel scientific evidence, and would treat it as infallible. 5 9 Frye v.
United States6° established the most widely accepted test which conditions the
admissibility of a theory on its general acceptance within the relevant scientific
community. The philosophy behind the Fyye test is that the burden of analyzing

52.
53.

Id.
Id.

54. The state is permitted to rebut when the defendant offers a pertinent trait of his own
character for the purpose of showing he did not commit the act in question. Id.
55. Id. In this situation, the court must determine whether the defendant's rights would be
unduly prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. Cf. Slough & Knightly, Olher Vices, Other
Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REv. 325 (1956).
56. See C. McCORMIcK, supra note 15, § 206(D).
57. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
58. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, 5 206(D). McCormick explained that "[i]f it were
shown that the profile was both valid and revealing - that it distinguishes between offenders and
non-offenders with great accuracy - then the balance might favor admissibility." Id. However,
McCormick also noted that "[i]t is far from dear, however, that any existing profile is this powerful."

Id.
59. Id. S 203.
60, 293 F. at 1014. The issue in Fye was whether to admit the results of a primitive polygraph
test. The court in Fye suggested a new standard for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence:

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
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the reliability of a new theory should be shifted from the judge to the relevant
scientific community."' Additionally, the belief is that the time required to achieve
general acceptance enables a group of qualified experts who disagree With the
b2
theory to assemble, creating a pool of potential rebuttal witnesses at trial.
Despite these advantages, the Frye test has met with considerable criticism." 3
Perhaps the most significant criticism involves the numerous difficulties courts
encounter in applying the Frye standard."4 A court utilizing the Frye test must
make a number of important discretionary decisions in determining how to
apply it. These decisions include identifying the relevant field, 65 defining the
scope of the theory that must be accepted, 66 and selecting methods for establishing general acceptance.6 For instance, a court must determine whether the
relevant field should include all psychologists or only the group of psychologists
who developed and researched a syndrome. The researchers are arguably the
most knowledgeable, but they may also be biased by self-interest. Other psychologists may be more objective, but may not be in a position to understand
the research.6 s As a result of this difficulty in application, one commentator has
suggested that, in practice, judges use the Frye test as a label to justify their
own views rather than as an analytical tool.6 9 Thus, the Frye test is another
source of broad and potentially arbitrary judicial discretion.
7
Several courts have rejected the Frye test and employed alternative tests.

61.

See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974). "The requirement of

general acceptance in the scientific community assures that those most qualified to assess the general
validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice." Id. at 743-44.

62.

Id. at 744. The hope is that the test would guarantee that "a minimal reserve of experts

exists who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a particular case."
Id.
63. See, e.g., Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLum. L. REV. 1197 (1980); Imwinkelried, The Standardfor Admitting Scientific
Evidence: A Critiquefrom the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554 (1982-83); Moenssens,
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence -- An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545
(1984); Note, Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 774 (1980).
64. See generally Gianelli, supra note 63 (Some of the problems in applying the Frye test include:

determining what is the appropriate scientific community that must accept the offered scientific
theory; determining what constitutes general acceptance; and deciding which offered evidence must
meet the Frye test before being admissible.).
65. Id. at 1208-10. Some scientific techniques involve more than one scientific field. Id. at
1208. Other scientific techniques could fall under both a broad field and a subspecialty. Id. at
1209.
66. Id. at :211-15. It is not clear whether the test requires acceptance of the underlying
theory, the technique, or both. Id. at 1211-12. This question raises the issue of whether the expert

testifying should be a scientific theorist or a technician. Id. at 1214.
67. Id. at 1215-19. The courts have recognized three methods of establishing general acceptance: (1) judicial opinions; (2) expert testimony; and (3) scientific and legal writings. Each one

presents discretionary problems. Id. at 1215.
68.

See id. at 1209.

69. Id. at 1221.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Baler, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.) (the court should admit
relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony "[u]nless an exaggerated
popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to
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These courts responded to criticisms that the Fye test excluded potentially relevant and reliable evidence. 71 One alternative is the reliability test, which re-2
quires only that the scientific evidence be reliable, rather than generally accepted.7
A second alternative is the hybrid test, which calls for either general acceptance
or reasonable demonstrability. 73 Yet another test lessens the standard to substantial, rather than general, acceptance. 74 Unfortunately, these alternative tests
do not escape the criticism that in reality the "test results" reflect and reinforce
75
the viewpoints of individual judges.
The rules of evidence permit broad judicial discretion, and the various tests
of admissibility governing novel scientific evidence invite the uneven use of that
discretion. The situation is further complicated because the nature of syndrome
evidence triggers a variety of fears and biases. Together, these factors make
the admissibility of syndrome evidence an area of great difficulty and uncertainty.
III.

THE NATURE OF SYNDROME EVIDENCE

Syndrome evidence requires the use of expert psychological testimony at
trial.7 6 The testimony is frequently based upon psychological and statistical correlations. 77 A number of courts and commentators have expressed dissatisfaction, in varying degrees, with the use of psychological opinion testimony in the courtroom. 7 The
case law manifests this mistrust in various forms: fear of invading the province of
the jury as to credibility determinations; 9 fear of the "battle of the experts"; s ')
mislead the jury"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); Coppolino v. Florida, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1968) (general acceptance standard or technique must have passed from experimentation
stage to stage of reasonable demonstrability), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 927 (1970).
71. See Imwinkelreid, supra note 63, at 557. As Imwinkelreid explained:
The impact of Frye is clear. Even if the world's leading scientific authority on a subject
attests to a new theory, even if the Nobel prize winner in a specific field conducts a
thorough, well-designed experiment to validate the technique, the courts cannot admit the
evidence until most of the scientists in that specialized field know and approve of the
theory.
Id.
72. McCormick supported the use of the relevancy standard. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15,

5 203.
73.

Massaro, supra note 17, at 435.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 203.
75. Massaro, supra note 17, at 435-36; see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
76. One exception is the battered child syndrome. The battered child syndrome is based on
physical, rather than psychological evidence.
77. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51
S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978) (general distrust of expert psychological testimony); Comment, The
Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom?, 38 MD. L. REv. 539 (1979) (general distrust
of expert psychological testimony). But see Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 30 (advocating the use
of expert psychological testimony in controlled situations).
79. See infra notes 118-32 and accompanying text.
80. The fear of the "battle of the experts" reflects the courts' concern that lay jurors are
not qualified or competent to weigh the relative value of competing experts' testimony. See, e.g.,
74.
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concern about a false aura of reliability;8 1 and a tendency to shun psychological
8 2
evidence in favor of physical evidence.
Some commentators assert that most psychological opinion testimony is more
akin to guesswork than to science and is usually "not more reliable than
chance."" On this basis, they would exclude the evidence as irrelevant.14 Similarly, they argue that even if the testimony could be shown to be somewhat
reliable and hence minimally probative, psychology has not advanced to the
level of reliability necessary to overcome evidentiary counterweights such as
5
undue prejudice and jury confusion.
Professor Morse has suggested that psychological expert testimony should
essentially be limited to descriptions of behavior actually witnessed by the expert.,
Probability or predictive data would be admissible only upon a showing that
the opinion was based upon "hard probability data." ' However, Morse noted
that very little psychological data would meet this standard.88 His primary conMinnesota v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982). In Saldana, a rape trauma syndrome case,
the court used the battle of the experts rationale to support its conclusion that the evidence should
be excluded. Id. The court explained:
Since jurors of ordinary abilities are competent to consider the evidence and determine
whether the alleged crime occurred, the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs any probative
value. To allow such testimony would inevitably lead to a battle of experts that would
invade the jury's province of fact-finding and add confusion rather than clarity.
Id. at 230.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973). The court noted:
The countervailing considerations most often noted to exclude what is relevant and material
evidence are the risk that admssion will 1) require undue consumption of time, 2) create
a substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the
jury, 3) or unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had a reasonable opportunity
to anticipate the evidence submitted. Scientific or expert testimony particularly courts the
second danger because of its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.
Id. at 1152. The court did not recommend that the "aura" rationale be used as a distinct justification for excluding novel scientific testimony. Instead, the court suggested that the "peculiar
risks" involved necessitate the use of additional tests of admissibility, such as the Frye test. Id.
82. Professor Massaro, writing about the rape trauma syndrome, asserts that under the broad
FED. R. EvID. definition of relevancy, "psychological bruises" are as relevant as physical bruises
in a consent rape trial. Massaro, supra note 17, at 439-40.
83. Comment, supra note 78, at 556. If psychological judgments and opinions are not more
credible than probable determinations, then the trier of law should exclude such evtdence due to
the lack of probative value. Id. For instance, two researchers reviewed the reliability of psychiatric
diagnoses and summarized that "It]here are no diagnostic categories for which reliability is uniformly
high." Id. at 378. They went so far as to conclude that "[tlhe reliability of psychiatric diagnosis
as it has been practiced since at least the late 1950's is not good." Id.
84. Id. at 556. Expert psychological testimony "must be excluded because it is irrelevant it has no tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than the existence of such fact would be without it." Id
85. Id.
86. Morse, supra note 78, at 601.
87. Id. Morse explains that "hard and methodologically reliable probability data bearing on
the difficulty of the actor's choice should be heard when it is available." Id. at 617 Without this
data, Morse contends that "experts should not be allowed to offer either theoretical views about
why the actor behaved as he did or opinions concerning the difficulty of the actor's choice." Id.
at 617-18.
88.

Id. at 601.
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cern was that, in the absence of hard data, expert psychological opinion testimony is based upon the expert's social and moral value judgments.8 9 From
this perspective, general acceptance may signal merely a concurrence of value
judgments rather than an indication of reliability or helpfulness.'
A second fear concerning syndrome evidence involves the use of statistical
probability data. An expert's opinion as to whether an individual fits into the
class of persons affected by a syndrome will necessarily involve a probability
determination. 9 ' When a probability determination is used against a defendant,
the potential for error raises serious questions.9 2 In presenting testimony as to
whether a defendant fits within the battering parent syndrome, for example,
the expert will base his opinion on whether the defendant's psychological and
behavioral characteristics fit within the statistical profile of the typical battering
parent.9 3 If the expert is wrong, his testimony may lead the jury to convict an
innocent defendant. With regard to predictions of future dangerousness, the
defendant's record and behavioral pattern will similarly be compared to a profile
of other violators.9 4 A mistaken opinion could result in a jail sentence of unwarranted length. Thus, even if the syndrome evidence is statistically reliable,
a defendant who deviates from the norm could be severely penalized.
A third concern about syndrome evidence is that the analysis of the particular
syndrome may arouse personal biases or fears. Syndromes frequently involve
important social or moral issues. A judge assessing the reliability of rape trauma
syndrome evidence may be influenced, consciously or subconsciously, by some

89. Id. at 602-03. Morse asserted:
The use of experts encourages courts, legislatures and legal decisionmakers to avoid the

hard social, moral, and legal questions posed by mental health laws
there were scientific answers to them. This tendency is exacerbated
questions are often conflated with ultimate legal questions and experts
conclusions about legal issues.
Id. at 602.
90. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. Morse contends

by responding as if
when mental health
are allowed to draw

that "the categories and
theories of mental health science are at present too imprecise and speculative to help clarify legal
questions."

Morse, supra note 78, at 604.

91. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
92. These questions are similar to those surrounding the use of character evidence against
a defendant: possibly low probative value coupled with potentially high prejudice. See People v.
Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968) (mathematics professor testified as to the statistical
probability that more than one couple matching the description of the robbery suspects might be
in the area).
93. The battering parent syndrome involves the use of a profile of a typical battering parent.
See, e.g., Sanders v. Georgia, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d -13 (1983) (expert testimony improperly
implicated the defendant, even though the expert never expressly concluded that the defendant fit
the profile of a battering parent); Duley v. Maryland, 56 Md. App. 275, 467 A.2d 776 (1983)
(child battering profile irrelevant because it did not tend to prove that the defendant committed
the act in question); Minnesota v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981) (battering parent syndrome testimony excluded as being in violation of MINN. R. EvID. 404(a)); see also infra notes 15157 and accompanying text.

94.

SeeJ.

MONAHAN,

THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR

63-90 (1981); Slobogin,

Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 117-19 (1984).
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of the traditional myths surrounding the crime of rape."s The admissibility of
battered child syndrome evidence or battering parent syndrome evidence may
turn, in part, upon the judge's perception of the growing public awareness of
the issue." Similarly, a judge determining the admissibility of expert testimony
on the Vietnam veteran's syndrome may be affected by the increasing public
sympathy for the plight of the Vietnam veteran.' 7
Calculating the full effect of the judges' personal perceptions regarding the
substance of the syndromes is difficult. Additionally, the perceived unreliability
of expert psychological testimony and the concern about the effect of probability
evidence upon the syndrome case law is difficult to measure. These issues are
expressly addressed in some opinions and are implicitly treated in others.' H The
nature of syndrome evidence, however, clearly contributes to the inconsistencies
in the relevant case law.
IV.

THE CASE LAW

The case law reveals no evidentiary principles upon which courts consistently
rely to resolve the issues surrounding syndrome evidence." Instead, the case
law reflects a great deal of confusion. This confusion emphasizes the need for
sound evidentiary principles upon which courts should decide.
A.

Helpfulness

The helpfulness requirement "" may be explored through Ibn-Tamas v. United
States,"" a case involving the battered woman syndrome. The defendant contended that she believed herself to be in imminent danger when she shot and
killed her husband. 111 The defense offered expert testimony by Dr. Lenore
95. Some of the traditional myths include:
[Glood women don't get raped; an unwilling woman cannot be raped; all rape victims
are attractive, young women; the victim provokes the rape because she wants to be raped
or because she puts herself in a dangerous situation; women's sexual fantasies prove they
enjoy rape; women often make false accusations of rape because they are revengeful, feel
guilty, or are pregnant; rapists are strangers to the victim; rapists rape because they are
overcome by sudden, uncontrollable sexual impulses; rapes occur in dark alleys, rapes are
interracial; rape only counts if the victim was a virgin.
Massaro, supra note 17 at 402.
96. See Case Note, Battered Child Syndrome, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 339, 348 (1984).
97. This defense, which is essentially an insanity plea, "is based upon the surfacing of mental
dysfunctions caused by extremely stressful situations such as active military duty during wartime."
Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Opening Pandora's Box?, 17 NEw ENG. L. REv. 91, 91-92
(1981); see also Ford, In Defense of the Defenders: The Vietnam Vet Syndrome, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 434
(1983) (discussing the growing awareness of the problems of the Vietnam veteran).
98. See e.g., Duley v. Maryland, 56 Md. App. 275, __, 467 A.2d 776, 780 (1983) (battering
parent case discussing the problems with probability evidence).
99. Massaro, supra note 17 at 464-66, 466 n.270,
100. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
101. 407 A.2d at 626.
102. Id. at 631. "Specifically, the defense proffered Dr. Walker for two purposes: to describe
the phenomenon of 'wife battering', and to give her opinion of the extent to which appellant's
personality and behavior corresponded to those of 110 battered women Dr. Walker had studied."
Id.
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Walker'03 on the battered woman syndrome to assist the jury in assessing the
credibility of the defendant's testimony. The trial court excluded the expert's
testimony." °' On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals applied the
Dyas test,'0 5 a variation on the helpfulness standard of Rule 702. This variation,
established in Dyas v. United States, prohibits admission of expert testimony unless
it is so clearly related to some profession, science, or field of study that it is
"beyond the ken of the average layman."111

s

The defendant testified that her husband had abused her. " 7 In response,
the state attempted to trivialize the beatings, and suggested the "logical reaction" of a truly frightened woman would have been to "call the police from
time to time or to leave [her husband]."" 5 Dr. Walker's proffered testimony
indicated that the cyclical nature of wife batterings includes periods of reconciliation and harmony,"' 9 and that women tend to blame themselves for the
beatings."10 Dr. Walker also stated that, in her opinion, the defendant represented a classic case of the battered woman syndrome."' The court found the
state had accurately presented the ordinary lay perception of how a battered
woman would act. Further, the court found that Dr. Walker's interpretation
of the facts differed from the ordinary lay perception. Thus, the court of appeals

103. Id.; see L.

WALKER, supra note 4.
104. Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 631. The trial court cited three reasons why the evidence should
be excluded:
First, it would "go... beyond those [prior violent] acts which a jury is entitled, to hear
about, sift, and try to understand the circumstances under which they arose, and draw
conclusions therefrom." Second, it would "invade... the province of the jury, who arc
the sole judges of the facts and triers of the credibility of the witnesses, including the
defendant." Third, Dr. Walker, "of necessity, concludes that the decedent was a batterer.
And that is not being tried in this case. It is the defendant who is on trial."
Id.
105. Id. at 632; see also supra notes 33-34.

106.
107.

See Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977).
lbn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 633.

On direct examination, Mrs. Ibn-Tamas had testified that immediately before the shooting
Dr. Ibn-Tamas had told her to pack and leave home by 10:00 a.m. When she replied
that she could not, he hit her in the head, under the arms, and in the thighs, and kicked
her in the stomach even though she was pregnant.
Id.
108. Id. at 633-34. The state suggested that Mrs. Ibn-Tamas' account of the pattern of beatings
was greatly exaggerated, and that her testimony about being in imminent danger was therefore
implausible. Id. at 633.
109. Id. at 634. Dr. Walker testified that:
Because there are periods of harmony, battered women tend to believe their husbands are
basically loving, caring men .... They also believe, however, that their husbands are
capable of killing them, and they feel there is no escape. Unless a shelter is available,
these women stay with their husbands, not only because they typically lack a means of
self-support but also because they fear that if they leave they will be found and hurt even
more.
Id.
110. Id. Dr. Walker explained that "the women assume that they themselves are somehow
responsible for their husbands' violent behavior." Id.
I11. Id.
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held that her testimony was beyond the ken of the average layman and therefore
admissible."_2 The state inadvertently aided the defendant's cause by- clearly
illustrating the common juror's perception of the situation. The majority found
the testimony to be helpful because the expert, using her specialized knowledge,
was able to present the counter-intuitive conclusion from the facts.'"
Conversely, the dissent found the battered wife syndrome evidence to be
irrelevant and unhelpful." 4 Rather than address Dr. Walker's testimony as a
whole, the dissent divided the testimony into separate mini-opinions." 5 In this
regard, the separate opinions on issues such as the defendant's passivity, low
self-esteem, and lack of confidence were not individually relevant to the question
of imminent danger." 6 The dissent reasoned that these issues were within the
ken of the average layman and therefore the jury was capable of determining
the reasonableness of the defendant's actions without the help of an expert." 7
B.

Province of the Jury and Aura of Reliability

Courts have reached inconsistent results in determining whether an expert's
syndrome testimony improperly invades the province of the jury."" Some courts
have held that expert testimony improperly reflects upon the credibility of a
witness.'"' The debate on this issue is illustrated in several cases involving
2
familial sexual abuse.'1"
In Wisconsin v. Haseltine,'2 1 the defendant was convicted of sexual contact
with his sixteen-year-old daughter.' 22 The prosecution's case included the tes112. Id. at 634-35. The court indicated that the issue in question was whether Dr. Walker's
testimony purported "to shed light on a relevant aspect of their relationship which a layperson,
without expert assistance, would not perceive from the evidence itself." Id. at 633.
113. Id. at 635; see also Smith v. Georgia, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.3d 678 (1981) (battered
woman's syndrome testimony helpful in explaining why woman did not leave her mate); New
Jersey v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984) (syndrome testimony helpful in explaining why
woman did not leave her mate); Washington v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984)
(syndrome testimony helpful in explaining why woman did not leave her mate).
114. Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 646 (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
115. The dissent felt that the component parts of the testimony were within the understanding
of the average juror. Id. at 654.
116. The dissenting judge found that these separate findings "had no bearing on whether the
appellant perceived herself in imminent danger when she shot her wounded husband."
Id. at 653.
117. Id. at 654.
118. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982) (rape trauma syndrome
testimony did not invade the province of the jury); New York v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084, 475
N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (expert permitted to testify as to whether victim suffers from the
rape trauma syndrome). But see Minnesota v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 1982) (rape
trauma syndrome testimony invades the province of the jury); Missouri v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d
235 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (rape trauma syndrome evidence not admissible as it relates to witness
credibility).
119. See supra note 118.
120. The purpose of expert testimony on the familial sexual abuse syndrome is to show whether
the victim in the particular case exhibits behavior consistent with having been an incest victim.
Minnesota v. Danielski, 350 N.W.2d 395, 396 (Minn. App. 1984).
121.
120 Wis. 2d 92, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984).
122. Id. at 93, 352 N.W.2d at 674. He was also convicted of threatening to harm her if she
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timony of a psychiatrist, qualified as an expert on incest, who testified that the
daughter was an incest victim. 1 23 On appeal, the defendant alleged the testimony

improperly bolstered his daughter's credibility.
dleton,'

25

24

Similarly, in Oregon v. Mid-

the defendant was convicted of raping his fourteen-year-old daughter.'

2 6

After the victim had been impeached with prior inconsistent statements, the
state called an expert who testified that the daughter's behavior, including her
inconsistent statements, was typical of incest victims.'

27

The defendant appealed,

asserting the jury should have determined the daughter's credibility without the
aid of expert testimony.'

28

The court in Haselline, noting that ordinarily the jury can assess the credibility of a witness without expert help, concluded the psychiatrist's testimony
should have been excluded.' 29 The court viewed the testimony that the victim
fit the incest victim profile as evidence of the victim's credibility. ' 311 In contrast,
the Middleton court held that if the expert testimony would assist the jury in
determining whether or not the incident occurred, it should be admitted.1

told about the incident. Id. at 93, 352 N.W.2d at 675. "The state sought to show that these two
incidents were part of a pattern of sexual and physical abuse by Haseltine against family members."
Id. at 95, 352 N.W.2d at 675.
123. Id. at 95-96, 352 N.W.2d at 675-76. The psychiatrist stated his opinion that there "was
no doubt whatsoever" that the daughter was an incest victim. Id. at 96, 352 N.W.2d at 676.
124. Id. at 92, 352 N.W.2d at 674.
125. 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
126. Id. at 429, 657 P.2d at 1216. The child reported the rape to a friend's mother, to a
Children's Services worker, and to a doctor at the hospital. Id. at 429, 657 P.2d at 1216. She
also gave a statement to the police, wrote out a statement, and testified before a grand jury. All
of these statements were consistent. Later, in the presence of her mother and defense counsel's
wife, she wrote a statement saying that she had lied about the rape. At trial, the girl testified that
she had been raped, and the defense impeached her with her prior inconsistent statements. Id.
127. Id. at 433 n.6, 657 P.2d at 1218 n.6. The pertinent portion of the expert's testimony
is as follows:
Q. Now, what about retracting reports before a Grand Jury or made to police? What
about that?
A. That is also a very common kind of thing to happen. When a child does do that,
again because of guilt, that they felt responsibility, they realize this is my father or my
stepfather or whatever, this is my parent and I still care for this person. And look what
I'm doing to them. And look what I'm doing to my family. And the easiest thing to do,
of course, is to say gee, I just made it all up and it isn't true after all. I think that kids
would like that to actually be true. They wish it were true, that it hadn't happened.
Id.
128. Id. at 430, 657 P.2d at 1216. The defendant denied the rape, and suggested that his
daughter had been pressured to testify against him by the Children's Service workers and her older
sister. Id.
129. 120 Wis. 2d at 96, 352 N.W.2d at 676. The court explained that:
jlaseltine's conviction depended on the jury believing the daughter's testimony. While there
was some medical evidence corroborating her testimony that Haseltine had threatened and
beat her, her account of the sexual assault was not corroborated by independent evidence.
Haseltine's entire defense consisted of witnesses who testified that the daughter was dishonest.
Id.
130. Id.
131. 294 Or. at 437, 657 P.2d at 1220-21. The court stated, however, that it would not have
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Thus, the court in Middleton focused on whether the information would be
helpful to the jury, rather than whether it would invade the province of the
''
j u r y. 3
A comparison of Middleton and Haseltine illustrates another concern about the
effect of syndrome evidence on the jury. Courts have often stated that expert
scientific testimony is surrounded by an unwarranted "aura of special reliability.""' The fear is that unwarranted juries may rely too heavily upon the
expert's opinion.'
In Haseltine, the court expressed the fear that the psychiatrist's opinion testimony might cause the jury to "abdicate its fact-finding role"
to the expert.' This concern contributed to the court's decision to exclude the
testimony. The court in Middleton also noted the possibility that the jurors might
place too much credence on the expert's testimony. However, the court held
the testimony admissible because of countervailing factors: the expert had been
qualified, her testimony concerned a proper subject for expert testimony, and
the testimony was relevant."' The court reasoned the danger of excessive reliance on the expert could be addressed by effective cross-examination."' In
Haseltine, the fear of excessive reliance on the expert by the jury affected the
decision. Although this fear also affected the Middleton court's decision, the
relevance and reliability of the expert testimony outweighed the fear and allowed
admission of the evidence.
C.

Character Evidence

The argument that syndrome testimony is merely character evidence offered
to show conformity on a particular occasion may be addressed by using cases
involving the battered child syndrome"' and battering parent syndrome."' The
two syndromes appear distinguishable because the battered child syndrome is
victim-oriented while the battering parent syndrome focuses on the defendant.4'

permitted the expert to actually say whether or not he believed the victim. Id. at 437 n. 11,657
P.2d 1220 (familial sexual abuse case in which expert was permitted to testify whether or not he
believed the victim).
132.
"Explaining this superficially bizarre behavior by identifying its emotional antecedents
could help the jury better assess the witness's credibility." Id. at 436, 657 P.2d at 1220.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
134. See supra note 81.
135. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 96, 352 N.W.2d at 676. The court reasoned that "the psychiatrist's opinion, with its aura of scientific reliability, creates too great a possibility that the jury
abdicated its fact-finding role to the psychiatrist and did not independently decide Haseltine's guilt."
Id.
136. 294 Or. at 437, 657 P.2d at 1221.
137. Id. "Opposing counsel will have an opportunity to attempt to discredit the testimony
through cross-examination and show any possible bias the expert may have." Id.
138. The battered child syndrome involves the use of a parent's prior conduct toward the
child. See, e.g., Case Note, Expert Medical Testimony Concerning "Battered Child Syndrome" Held Admissible,
42 FORDHAM L. REv. 935, 935 (1974) (medical testimony on the battered child syndrome is admissible as circumstantial proof that the child's injuries were not accidental).
139. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
140. The battered child syndrome is derived from the physical injuries of the victim, while
the battered parent syndrome is based upon a psychological profile of the parent, the defendant.
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Thus, Rule 404's prohibition against the use of character evidence to show
conformity on a particular occasion should bar battering parent syndrome evidence, but not battered child testimony.' 4' This distinction, however, is not
always clear in application.
Expert opinion testimony regarding the battered child syndrome usually involves a medical doctor's judgment that the child's injuries were not accidental.' 42 Although the expert does not directly testify as to the defendant's
culpability, some courts have permitted jurors to infer from the syndrome evidence that the parent's story is a fabrication. 4 3 Further, if the parent is in sole
44
custody of the child, the jurors may infer that the parent inflicted the injuries.
Yet, because the evidence is not offered to show the defendant's disposition to
commit the crime, the testimony is admissible under the character evidence

rule. 145
Expert testimony on the battering parent profile is similarly offered to demonstrate the injuries were not accidental and to discredit the parent's story.
However, expert testimony on the battering parent syndrome will be excluded
to protect the defendant from prejudicial character evidence, '4 unless the defendant first raises the issue. While the two syndromes appear different on the
surface, the disparate treatment they receive is difficult to justify. They are
offered for similar purposes, and they are used in a similar fashion at trial.
Thus, the character evidence rule appears to have been applied unevenly.
Some commentators argue that the underlying theory and methodology of
a particular syndrome can be shown to be particularly reliable, the general
prohibition embodied in Rule 404 should not apply. 4 7 In Minnesota v. Loebach, 14
the state supreme court held that expert testimony concerning the battering
parent syndrome should be excluded unless the defendant first raises the issue. '4
The court explained in dicta, however, that this prohibition is required only
until further evidence clearly establishes the scientific reliability and accuracy
of the syndrome evidence.' 5 0 Thus, the court left open the possibility of an
exception to the general prohibitions against character evidence.

141. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
142. The battered child syndrome has been defined "as encompassing non-accidental injuries
perpetrated by a child's caretaker." North Carolina v. Mapp, 45 N.C. App. 574, 577, 264 S.E.2d
348, 352 (1980).
143.
Hcnson,
144.
Henson,
145.

See, e.g., United States
33 N.Y.2d 63, 74, 304
See, e.g., United States
33 N.Y.2d 63, 74, 304
See, e.g., Minnesota v.

v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 529 (5th Cir.
N.E.2d 358, 364, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657, 665
v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 529 (5th Cir.
N.E.2d 358, 364, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657, 665
Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 63-64 (Minn.

1981); New York v.
(1973).
1981); New York v.
(1973).
1981) (battered child

syndrome evidence admitted, battering parent syndrome evidence excluded as being in violation of
Rule 404).

146. Id. at 64.
147.
148.

See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981).

149.
150.

Id. at 64.
Id.
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Probability Evidence

All syndrome testimony involves, to some degree, a probability determination.' Duley v.State,'1 2 a child abuse case, demonstrates some of the problems
that may arise when probability evidence is used. The prosecution offered expert
testimony as to the profile of child batterers. "' The expert testified that batterers
are frequently young and immature, and under great economic or domestic
stress. In addition, the batterers were sometimes beaten during their own childhoods.'1 4 The prosecution asserted the defendant fit the profile and was the
type of individual most likely to commit the offense."
The court conducted no inquiry into the reliability of the theory underlying
the testimony. It nevertheless concluded the evidence should have been excluded.
The court explained the testimony was equivalent to evidence that a majority
of homicides are committed by men." ' As such, the court found the evidence
was irrelevant because it did not tend to prove the defendant committed the
crime.""
E.

Reliance Upon Precedent

Without consistent application of sound evidentiary principles, courts will
rely on unclear, discretion-based decisions, resulting in additional ill-reasoned
decisions. In Minnesota v. Saldana,'"5 the Minnesota Supreme Court held rape
trauma syndrome evidence inadmissible because it had not yet reached a level

151. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
152. 56 Md.App. 275, 467 A.2d 776 (1983). The trial court convicted the defendant of both
child abuse and manslaughter in connection with the death of his infant daughter. Id. at -,
467
A.2d at 778.
153. Id. at __, 467 A.2d at 779.
154. Id. The expert, Dr. Blackbourne, testified as follows:
[Mr. Sengstack, State's Attorney]: All right. Can you tell me whether or not in your
research of the matter, have you had occasion to determine whether or not.a certain type
of individual might be more prone to commit this type of [child] abuse?
Mr. Cumberland (Defense Counsel]: Objection.
The Court: Overruled. You may answer.
A. [Dr. Blackbourne]: Yes. There is sort of a profile of common facts in a series of
cases.
Q.
[Mr. Sengstack]: All right. Can you tell me 'hat that profile consists of?.
Mr. Cumberland: Objection.
The Court: Overruled.
A. [Dr. Blackbourne]: The persons involved in the Battered Child Syndrome often
are young, somewhat immature, unable to really handle their emotions in a socially acceptable fashion. Frequently they are in a stressful situation, either economic, domestic
stresses on them, and subject to sort of flying off when certain added stress is presented.
They sometimes have been victims of quite harsh punishment themselves as they were
growing up, is sort of a pattern which they fall back into.

Id.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
56 Md. App. at __, 467 A.2d at 780.
Id.
324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
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of reliability that would supplement the jury's common sense. 5 9 Finding rape6
and familial sexual abuse to be similar, the court in Minnesota v. Danielski' 0
relied on Saldana in refusing to admit familial sexual abuse syndrome testimony. 6' The court was not persuaded that the familial sexual abuse62 syndrome
testimony was more reliable than rape trauma syndrome evidence.'
Under the circumstances, the Danieiski court could not have been persuaded
that the familial sexual abuse syndrome evidence was reliable. The court did
not independently consider or discuss the underlying theories and research pertaining to the syndrome. If the court had inquired, it would have discovered
a body of research distinct from the rape trauma syndrome evidence, with
different levels of reliability and accuracy. The inferences to be drawn from
the two types of syndrome testimony are different, thereby affecting the relevance of the testimony. 63 Furthermore, had the Danielski court examined the
Saldana case more closely, it would have found that the Saldana court made no
meaningful inquiry into the underlying theory and method involved in the rape
trauma syndrome.' 64
F. Summation
The case law indicates a need for consistent evidentiary analysis in the area
of syndrome evidence. However, not all syndromes should be treated alike. In
fact, important substantive distinctions exist. Yet, the syndromes are similar in
nature and should be evaluated with a consistent evidentiary approach. A consistent approach would create important evidentiary principles for courts and
practitioners to look to for guidance. When applied, these principles could harmonize decisions concerning the same syndrome and highlight important distinctions between different syndromes.
159. Id. at 230. The expert had testified that in her opinion the complaining witness had not
fantasized the rape, as the defense had suggested. Id. at 229.

160. 350 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 1984). The facts in Danielski are as follows. Dean Danielski
was charged with 17 various sex offenses, alleged to have been perpetrated against his step-daughter.

Id. at 396. The state filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce the testimony of a licensed
psychologist about the familial sexual abuse syndrome. "The purpose of this testimony would be
to show that the victim in this case exhibited behavior consistent with her having been a victim
of sexual abuse." The trial court denied the motion in limine and the state appealed. Id.
161. Id. at 397. The court explained:
The reasoning in Sadana is equally applicable to this case. The elements of criminal sexual
conduct and intrafamilial sexual abuse are similar, covering parallel types of criminal activities .... Daniclski was also charged with criminal sexual conduct in the first degree;
it would be absurd to conclude that while "rape trauma syndrome" testimony is not
admissible, familial sexual abuse testimony is admissible, when it is clear the two involve
substantially similar testimony.
Id.
162. Id.
163. The familial sexual abuse syndrome is used to infer that the victim has been abused and
that the abuser was a family member. The rape trauma syndrome is used only to infer the victim
has been raped.
164. The court concluded cursorily that the "[r]ape trauma syndrome is not the type of
scientific test that accurately and reliably determines whether a rape has occurred." Saldana, 324
N.W.2d at 229.
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ANALYSIS

The broad judicial discretion exercised in cases involving syndrome evidence
has caused many inconsistent and problematic decisions. In this section, the
fears concerning syndrome evidence, the tests for admissibility, and the bases
of significant decisions will be discussed and critically analyzed. This discussion
should help to identify the important evidentiary principles upon which decisions
should be based.
Professor Morse has raised serious questions about the usefulness of psychological opinion testimony at trial."' Despite these doubts, other commentators
assert that the expert's "informed speculation" can indeed be helpful and is
preferrable to unbridled judicial discretion or the uninformed opinions of lay
jurors."6 ' Although lay jurors are sometimes capable of drawing inferences from
psychological data and other evidence, these commentators suggest the question
is whether the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact, and not whether
the trier of fact "can manage when left to his own devices."'" 7 This Note
assumes that expert psychological testimony can be sufficiently reliable to be
helpful to the trier of fact.
The helpfulness requirement, one recalls, was intended to be liberally applied.
If the underlying theory is reliable and the expert's opinion can provide
useful insight that the trier of fact could not otherwise discover from the evidence, then the testimony should be admitted.'
When applying this standard,
the testimony should be considered as a whole, rather than examined in its
component parts.'" The strength of expert testimony rests in the expert's ability
to tie the component parts of a theory together into a cohesive whole.
Even strong syndrome evidence retains some measure of doubt because of
the element of probability involved.'"' Nevertheless, not all probability evidence
is inherently prejudicial.112 A syndrome expert's testimony involves the use of
a probability determination, but the probability is based upon education and
practical experience, as opposed to mere conjecture."'"' If the underlying theory
165.
166.

See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 30, at 463. Bonnie and Slobogin explain their position as

follows:
A defendant's past psychological functioning cannot be reconstructed with scientific
precision. The truth will remain very much in the shadows whether or not mental health
professionals are permitted to offer their opinions. In formulating an evidentiary test, then,
we should begin by comparing the knowledge of mental health professionals not with the
knowledge of physicists about the laws of motion, but with that of laymen about psychological aberration and criminal behavior. We should ask whether the observations, intuitions, and hypotheses of clinicians offer a useful and acceptable supplement to those of
Everyman.

Id.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 463-64.
See supra notes 29-38.
See Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 633.
See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 15 § 206(D).
Bonnie & Slobogin, supia note 30, at 461-62.
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and method are reasonably reliable, the fact that the evidence involves some
degree of uncertainty should not justify its exclusion. 174 The degree of imprecision can be analyzed and exposed on cross-examination, and arguments can
75
be advanced as to the proper weight of the evidence.'
As with probability evidence, the admissibility of character evidence may
turn on the underlying reliability of the syndrome evidence. Rule 404 protects
defendants from minimally probative and possibly highly prejudicial character
evidence.' 76 Because the policy behind the rule is sound and its usefulness can
only be protected through rigid application, exceptions should be granted only
when evidence is highly probative and minimally prejudicial. Yet, if highly
reliable and certifiably accurate syndrome evidence is offered against a defendant, then the purpose of Rule 404 is not furthered by excluding the evidence. 77
The tests for admissibility of novel scientific evidence are intended to assist
the judge in assessing the reliability of the theory.' 78 Unfortunately, none of
the several tests'79 underlying the evidence has proven effective in focusing
attention on reliability, especially as applied to syndrome evidence. The existing
tests are too open-ended to be functional. 80
Professor McCormick has recommended a set of eleven factors to be considered when assessing the reliability and probative value of novel expert testimony. The new test directs the judge's attention to the following factors:
(1) the methodology's error rate;
(2) standards controlling the application of the methodology;
(3) safeguards built in to the theory;
(4) comparison to similar admissible techniques;
(5) the measure of acceptance in the relevant field of study;
(6) the inference to be drawn from the evidence;
(7) whether the theory could be easily explained to and understood by
the jury;
(8) whether the underlying data are easily verifiable;
174. Id.
175. Id. at 466. Bonnie and Slobogin explain:
The imprecision of an expert's concepts, and the possible shortcomings of his evaluative
techniques, may be explored through direct examination and cross-examination, and in
arguments by counsel concerning the weight of his testimony. The court can confine the
expert to his sphere of specialized knowledge, and exclude opinions on ultimate issues
involving moral judgments. Cautionary instructions are also available. Even if the defense
has offered the only psychiatric testimony, the natural skepticism of the jurors, coupled
with the safeguards already mentioned, should virtually eliminate the danger of the jury
abdicating its factfinding role.
Id.
176. See supra text accompanying note 56.
177. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
178. &e supra note 61 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
180. Moenssens, supra note 63, at 573. Moenssens asserts that "[a]fter the evidence has been
gathered and the information reviewed, the judge should base his admissibility decision on considerations more clearly defined and articulated than the nebulous general acceptance standard or
a loose relevancy concept." Id.
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whether other experts are available to evaluate the theory;
the importance of the evidence to the case at hand; and
whether the methodology and theory were properly applied to the
case."'
The use of this new test would not solve all the problems that have surfaced
in connection with the Frye test. In fact, the core of the Frye test remains; the
level of acceptance in the relevant scientific community is still a factor.'12 Judicial
discretion would continue to play a large part in determining the admissibility
of syndrome evidence. However, the factors would control the use of judicial
discretion by requiring judges to pay more attention to the facts which reflect
upon reliability, such as the potential rate of error and the inference to be
drawn from the evidence." ' Additionally, the new test addresses the concern
that juries might be overwhelmed by novel scientific evidence by taking into
account the clarity with which the theory can be explained and the extent to
which the data is verifiable.' s
The new test reduces concern about the layman's ability to evaluate novel
scientific evidence properly by characterizing capacity to evaluate as a factor
to be considered rather than as a controlling consideration.'8 One commentator
has recently concluded that lay jurors are not overwhelmed by scientific evidence.'m Similarly, another commentator has opined that jurors are fully capable
of comparing one expert's qualifications against another's' 87 when more than
one expert's testimony is offered as evidence. Even if these concerns are realistic,
they should be addressed through measures such as effective cross-examination
or cautionary instructions.' 88 Reliable evidence should not be excluded because
jurors may be overwhelmed.
Similarly, otherwise reliable evidence should not be excluded for fear that
(9)
(10)
(11)

181.
McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOwA L. REv.
879, 911-12 (1982). The factors are:
(1) the potential error rate in using the technique; (2) the existence and maintenance of
standards governing its use; (3) presence of safeguards in the characteristics of the technique;
(4) analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible; (5) the extent to
which the technique has been accepted by scientists in the field involved; (6) the nature
and breadth of the inference adduced; (7) the clarity and simplicity with which the technique
can be described and its results explained; (8) the extent to which the basic data are
verifiable by the court and jury; (9) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate
the technique; (10) the probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the
case; and (11) the care with which the technique was employed in the case.
182. Id.
183. Regarding McCormick's approach, Moenssens asserts that the "[ulse of these standards
would allow a judge to make a decision based upon significant factual information. The burden
on the trial judge would be greater than it has been in the past, but such a solution is preferable
to the Frye test." Moenssens, supra note 63, at 574.
184. McCormick, supra note 181, at 912.
185. See supra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
186. Imwinkelreid, supra note 63, at 569-70.
187. See Younger, A PracticalApproach to the Use of Expert Testimony, 31 CLEV. ST L. REv. 39,
40 (1982).
188. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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it intrudes upon the province of the jury.'
The usurpation argument reflects
a general distrust of expert testimony and has been called "empty rhetoric."" '
Judges excluding expert testimony on this basis may be exercising their discretionary powers to exclude evidence which they find personally objectionable.
Expert opinion testimony that a defendant or a victim fits a particular profile
should not be excluded under the "province of the jury" argument.' 9 '

VI.

A

PROPOSAL

This Note does not purport to offer an all-encompassing solution' to the
problems surrounding the admissibility of syndrome evidence. Nor is a "new
rule" of evidence suggested. Instead, the proposal offered involves a back-tobasics approach, incorporating the priorities and organizing the concepts developed in the preceding section.
The proposal includes three parts. First, renewed emphasis should be placed
on the underlying reliability of a particular theory. This includes replacing the
Frye test with the eleven factors mentioned above. Second, the helpfulness requirement should be interpreted liberally. Third, arguments involving either the
fear of invading the province of the jury or concern about the jury's ability
to properly deal with expert psychological testimony should be directed to the
weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.
This reassessment of evidentiary priorities could help lessen some of the
inconsistencies that plague the syndrome case law. The Frye test is unworkable.
Adoption of the eleven factors would limit this traditional source of unchecked
judicial discretion. De-emphasizing the province of the jury and the aura of
reliability arguments, would also stabilize the case law. Additionally, liberal
interpretation of the helpfulness requirement would facilitate reliable evidence
reaching the finder of fact.
Implementation of this proposal could enhance predictability greatly. The
reasons for the exclusion or admission of syndrome evidence would be more
discernible because a court would presumably discuss the factors on which it
is basing its decision. Reliance on precedent would therefore be an easier task
for the practitioner.
Of course, the proposal would simply minimize rather than eliminate the
problems associated with the admissibility of syndrome evidence. Judicial discretion would still play a large part in the admissibility decision. Judges determined to enforce their own personal values could still do so. However, the
proposal would ensure that most discretionary decisions concerning the admissibility of syndrome evidence are at least more informed, more factually based,
and more controlled.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Kathy H. Thomas is a victim of the syndrome syndrome, the pattern of
189.

See supra notes 118-132 and accompanying text.

190. J. WIOMORE, supra note 35 S 1920.
191. See Middljon, 294 Or. at 432-35, 657 P.2d at 1218-19 (the jury's function cannot be
usurped because the jury is not bound by the expert's opinion).
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poor evidentiary analysis, which haunts syndrome cases."" Thomas is not the
only victim. Judges must resolve difficult evidentiary questions without the benefit of adequate precedent. Additionally, practitioners are unable to prepare their
clients' cases properly.
The proposal recommended in this Note, if implemented, could establish
the consistency lacking in this area of the law. This consistency is needed not
only to resolve existing anomalies, but also to evaluate new syndrome evidence
as it arises.' The return to sound evidentiary principles is perhaps the only
cure for the syndrome syndrome.
DAVID WALLACE

192. See supra notes 1-25 and accompanying text.
193. The PreMenstrual Syndrome (PMS), a hormonal imbalance that can cause violent behavior, is recognized as a legal form of insanity in France. Nat'l L.J., Feb. 15, 1982, at 16,
col. 1. In England, two women on trial for murder and attempted murder were released on
probation after an expert testified that they suffered from PMS. Id. at 1, col. 4, 12, col. I.
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